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CONTRIBUTORS TO THE JANUARY ISSUE
SISTER M. ANN JOACHIM, 0. P. Chairman, Social Science Depart-
ment, Siena Heights College, Adrian, Michigan. LL.B. 1923, Detroit
College of Law; LL.M. 1924, University of Detroit; A.B. 1931, Saint
Joseph College, Adrian, Michigan; M.A. 1933, Loyola University, Chi-
cago; Ph.D. 193.6, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland. Au-
thor Constitutions of the United States and Switzerland, Historically
Analyzed and-Compared, Fribourg, 1936. Contributor to KAPPA BETA
PI QUARTERLY, FORDHAm LAW REVIEW HOSPITAL PROGRESS, COLLEGE
WORLD, TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW. She is the only nun to be admitted
to practice law before the United States Supreme Court. Member of
the Michigan State and Lenawee County Bars.
THORVALD SOLBERG, for biographical notice and list of- contributions,
see WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA. Was in charge of the Copyright Office,
as the first Register of Copyrights, from 1897 to 1930, and was active
during that period, and all the years since in trying to secure advanced
and honorable international copyright relations between the United
States and foreign countries.
NOTES
CEMETERIES As NuISANCEs.-Cemeteries are common occurences,
indeed necessities. One has been defined as "a place or area of ground
set apart for burial of the dead, and created by act of setting ground
apart for burial, marking and distinguishing it from adjoining ground
as a place of burial." I There is no doubt but that to some persons they
may become distasteful, but their necessity has never been really chal-
lenged. It will be the purpose of this note to determine the occasions
when a cemetery may become a nuisance, either public or private.
The universal weight of authority seems to indicate that cemeteries
are not nuisances per se.2 An Illinois case, Rosehill Cemetery Company
v. Chicago states this view lucidly, Justice Duncan giving the opinion,
1 Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery Co., 316 Ill. 226, 147
N. E. 104, 105 (1925).
2 Hume v. Laurel Hill Cemetery, 142 Fed. 552 (1905 C. C.) (Avoiding an
ordinance which arbitrarily forbid burials within entire county where public safety
was not endangered); Bryan v. Birmingham, 154 Ala. 447, 45 So. 922 (1908);
Union Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 20 Ala. App. 291, 101 So. 517 (1924); McDaniel
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"That a cemetery is not a nuisance per se is well established by the
decisions of the courts. The right of local legislative bodies to regulate
and prohibit the use of land for a cemetery is based upon the ground
that it may endanger the lives and health .of the people in the local-
ity .... Before it can be abated or its use enjoined, it must be clearly
and satisfactorily proven to be a fact." 3 Another case 4 from the same
jurisdiction says that burial places are indispensable and concern the
public health, and are not the subject of absolute prohibition by legis-
lative action. "A cemetery is not a nuisance per se. It is a lawful and
essential institution" says a Georgia case.5
This rule seems to extend to private as well as public burial places.
A man has a legal right to build a tomb on his own land and such is
v. Forrest Park Cemetery Co., 156 Ark. 571, 246 S. W. 874 (1923); Los Angeles
County v. Hollywood Cemetery Ass'n., 124 Cal. 344, 57 Pac. 153, 71 Am. St. Rep.
75 (1889); Carter v. Chotiner, 210 Cal. 288, 291 Pac. 577 (1930) ; Harper v. Nash-
ville, 136 Ga. 141, 70 S. E. 1102 (1911); Hallman v. Atlanta Child's Home, 161
Ga. 247, 130 S. E. 814 (1925) (Allowed establishment of negro cemetery in white
residential section)4 Lake View v. Letz, 44 Ill. 81 (1867); Village of Villa Park
v. Wanderer's Rest Cemnetery Co., 316 Ill. 226, 147 N. E. 104 (1925); Rosehill
Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 353 Ill. 11, 185 N. E. 170, 87 A. L. R. 742 (1933);
Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind. 79 (1867); Payne v. Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 109
N. W. 203 (1906); Kuhlman v. Beloit, 123 Kan. 645, 256 Pac. 806 (1927); Mus-
grove v. Si. Louis Church, 10 Ia. App. 431 (1855); Hardin v. Huckaby, 6 La.
App. 640 (1927); Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309, 36 Am. Rep. 316 (1880); Nelson
v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Cemetery Ass'n., 111 Minn. 149, 127 N. W. 626,
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 565, 20 Ann. Cas. 790 (1910); Normandy Consol. District v.
Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286 S. W. 86 (1926) (Court disregarded argument that in-
tended cemetery would cause a loss in public revenue to the district because it
would be exempt from taxes); St. Joseph v. Georgetown Lodge, 22 Mo. App.
1076, 11 S. W. (2d) 1082 (1928) (Avoiding an ordinance declaring a cemetery
vithin the city limits to be a nuisance); Symmonds v. Novelty Cemetery Ass'n.,
21 S. W. (2d) 889 (1930 Mo.) (Allowed cemetery even though it was adjoining
property of valuable residential nature) ; Braasch v. Cemetery Ass'n., 69 Neb. 300,
95 N. W. 646, 5 Ann. Cas. 132 (1902); Morton v. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic
Church Society, 56 Misc. 71, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1100 (1907); Mdritz v. United
Brethren Church on Staten Island, 269 N. Y. 125, 199 N. E. 29 (1935) rev. 244
App. Div. 121 (But see Moore v. United States Cremation Co., 286 N. Y. Supp.
639 (1936) where a declaratory judgment prevented the erection of a crematory or
columbarium in zoned residential property); Ellison v. Washington, 58 N. C. 57,
-'5 Am. Dec. 430 (1859); Board of Health v. Lewis, 196 N. C. 641, 146 S. E. 592
(1929); Henry v. Perry Township, 48 Ohio St. 671, 30 N. E. 1122 (1891); Clinton
Cemetery Ass'n. v. McAttee, 27 Okla. 160, 111 Pac. 392, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945
(1910); Wygant v. McLaughlin, 39 Ore. 429, 64 Pac. 867, 54 L. R. A. 636, 87
Am. St. Rep. 673 (1901) (Invalidating ordinance prohibiting burial of dead bodies
as unreasonable); Mensi v. Walker, 160 Tenn. 468, 26 S. W. (2d) 132 (1930)
appeal dismissed in 283 U. S. 791, 75 L. Ed. 1417, 51 S. Ct. 363 (1931); Dunn v.
Austin, 77 Texas 139, 11 S. W. 1125 (1889); Elliott v. Ferguson, 37 Texas Civ.
App. 40, 83 S. W. 56 (1904); Sherman v. Crawford, Texas Civ. App. 127 S. W.
1075 (190); Farb v. Theis, 250 S. W. 290 (1923 Texas Civ. App.); Hite v. Cash-
mere Cemetery Ass'n., 158 Wash. 421, 29.0 P ac. 1008 (1930).
8 352 Ill. 11, 185 N. E. 170, 87 A. L. R. 742 (1933).
4 Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191, 22 Am. Rep. 71 (1873).
5 Hall et. al. v. Moffett et. al., 170 S. E. 192 (1933 Ga.).
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not in itself a nuisance unless from the particular circumstances sur-
rounding it the public health is endangered. 6 An old case from Alabama,
Kingsbury v. Flowers,7 outlines this matter of private cemeteries well.
"Burial places for the 'dead are indispensable. They may be the property
of the public, devoted to the uses of the public, or the owner of a free-
hold may devote a part of his premises to the burial of his family or
friends. . . . It is quite an error to suppose that of itself a burying
ground is a nuisance to those living in its immediate vicinity. Much
depends upon the mode of interment whether it can be justly asserted
that in any event injury will result from it."
Although it has been fairly well established that cemeteries are not
nuisances per se, the authorities are agreed that under certain circum-
stances they may be enjoined or abated.8 Whether or not a cemetery is
a nuisance is a question of fact, to be determined by the circumstances
of each case. The question of nuisance depends largely upon the position
and extent of the grounds and the manner in which they are drained
and the burials therein affected. 9 Equity will enjoin the use of land
for cemetery purposes so situated that the burial of the dead will in-
jure life or health, either by corrupting the atmosphere or the water of
wells or springs.' 0 A leading Iowa case, Payne v. Town of Wayland,"
granted an injunction against a cemetery, recognizing the fact that the
cemetery was built on a mound between two natural streams, that the
soil was chiefly sand and clay, especially adapted for the carrying of
subterranean waters, that the south side of the mound was perpetually
wet showing percolation, and that these circumstances of drainage and
seepage would cause nearby springs and streams to become contami-
nated, thus injuring the health of man and the watering livestock. In
Cheektowaga v. Sts. Peter and Paul Greek Russian Orthodox Church.
the New York court held a cemetery a private nuisance where there
were upwards to thirty drinking water wells in close proximity, and
from the depth that human bodies were usually buried there were left
only six feet of open, porous stony sand and loam as a barrier of safety
between the decaying bodies and the drinking water supply of the neigh-
borhood. 12 Where cellars neighboring the cemetery were filled with
8 Barnes v. Hathorn, 54 Me. 124 (1866).
7 65 Ala. 479, 39 Am. Rep. 14, 15 (1880).
8 Payne v. Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 109 N. W. 203 (1906) ; Nelson v. Swedish
Evangelical Lutheran Cemetery Ass'n., 111 Minn. 149, 127 N. W. 626 (1910);
Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Ass'n., 58 Neb. 94, 78 N. W. 488 (1899); Clark
v. Lawrence, 59 N. C. (6 Jones Eq.) 83, 78 Am. Dec. 241 (1860); Surrat v. Den-
nis, 199 N. C. 757, 155 S. E. 865 (1930); Jung et a]. v. Neraz, 71 Texas 396,
9 S. W. 344 (1888); Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Ass'n., 28 S. W. 1023 (1895
Texas Civ. App.).
9 Farb v. Theis, 230 S. W. 290 (1923 Texas Civ. App.).
10 Braasch v. Cemetery Ass'n. of Evangelical Lutheran Soc., 69 Neb. 300,
95 N. W. 646 (1903).
11 131 Iowa 659, 109 N. W. 203 (1906).
12 123 Misc. 458, 205 N. Y. Supp. 334 (1924).
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water which could not have been surface water, and there was a prob-
able connection between the water in the basement and that which
would percolate from the graves through the clay soil permeated with
sand and gravel seams, a Minnesota court enjoined a cemetery.1 3 In
Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Ass'n.14 the tribunal decided against
the defendant cemetery company, saying that germs flourish in decom-
posing bodies for an indefinite period of time, that this soil was not of
a type as would act as a germicide, that since the cemetery was on a
crest of. a hill and the soil beneath not impervious to seepage, people
would become infected by the use of water into which these germs
could easily come from seeping moisture from the burial place. A Texas
case, Jung v. Neraz 15 enjoined the creation of a proposed burial ground
on the basis that drainage would poison the wells, and that malodors
would injure the health of the plaintiffs and render their homes unin-
habitable. In this case, the plaintiffs had been living in the neighborhood
for a long time, and it seemed that there were other equally as good
spots to place the proposed cemetery, A Connecticut court decided that
a long unused. cemetery in a densely populated section of the. city of
Waterbury had become obnoxious and was to be regarded as a public
nuisance so as to enjoin further interments.10 In another case where
some of the graves had been left open, or coffins poorly covered with
dirt so that they could be seen, and unhealthy and disgusting odors
therefrom made the plaintiff and his wife ill, the cemetery was decided
to be a nuisance and was abated, the court stating that the right to pure
air was a right to be thus protected.'7
However, a cemetery will not be enjoined because it offends merely
the esthetic sense of an adjacent proprietor,' 8 nor will unpleasant re-
flections as to death and possible damnation warrant equitable inter-
ference even though caused by the nearby cemeteries. 10 The Maine
court in an old case, Monk v. Packard, stated the law's views upon this
matter of graveyards and sensibilities well; "Cemeteries are not neces-
sarily even shocking to the senses of ordinary persons. Many are ren-
dered attractive by whatever appropriate art or skill can suggest, while
18 Nelson v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Cemetery Ass'n. of Chicago City,
111 Minn. 149, 127 N. W. 626 (1910). (See Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum's Ass'n.,
103 Wash. 429, 174 Pac. 961, 1 A. L. R. 541, where owners of land adjoining
cemetery containing mausoleum were not entitled to injunction restraining an ad-
dition thereto, the blank wall of which will be within twenty feet of their line,
and which will be so constructed that no damage from seepage or noxious odors
can accrue.)
14 58 Neb. 94, 78 N. W. 488 (1899).
15 71 Texas 396, 9 S. W. 344.
16 Scovill v. McMahon, 62 Conn. 378, 26 Atl. 479, 21 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am.
St. Rep. 350 (1892).
17 Union Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 20 Ala. App. 291, 101 So. 517 (1924).
18 Sutton v. Findlay Cemetery Ass'n., 270 Ill. -11, 110 N. E. 315 (1915).
19 McDaniel v. Forrest Park Cemetery Co., 156 Ark. 571, 246 S. W. 874
(1923).
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to others of morbid or excited fancy or imagination they become un-
pleasant and induce mental disquietude from association exaggerated
by superstitious fears. The law protects against real wrong and injury
combined, but not against either or both merely fanciful." 20 The court
in that case disregarded the plaintiff's pleas that the cemetery had
been moved so that tombstones were visible from the front windows
of the house. The fact that a cemetery lot "was unsightly and disfigured,
and needed to be filled and graded to put it in proper condition" did
not warrant its being declared a nuisance in Woodstock Burial Ground
Ass'n. v. Hager,21 the court declaring that the law does not cater to
men's tastes.
The authorities seem to be in accord that cemeteries will not be
enjoined or abated merely because they might bring about a deprecia-
tion in the value of neighboring property.22 They are necessary and
therefore one establishing a burial ground is not liable in damages or
subject to equitable action merely because of the fact that.people are
less willing to live near a cemetery, thus lowering the rental or sale
value of the land.2 3
Private convenience must yield to the convenience of the public
when it comes to establishing sites for burials and the mischief must
be undoubted before there is any interference by the court.2 4 A Penn-
sylvania court refused to grant an injunction, even in the face of plain-
tiff's pleas that a cemetery would contaminate his water supply, because
the matter was a question of public necessity, the cemetery was located
outside the town in a sparsely settled district, and there was insufficient
evidence that the anticipated injury would ever occur.2 5 It is not enough
that the injury be probable or contingent,26 and the cases seem agreed
that the burden of proof in showing facts sufficient to allow equitable
action is upon the one asserting that a nuisance exists. 2 7 Thus it would
seem that courts try to favor the cemeteries as much as is equitably
possible.
Leon L. Lancaster, Jr.
20 71 Me. 309, 36 Am. Rep. 315, 317 (1880).
21 68 Vt. 488, 35 AtI. 341 (1896).
22 Hume v. Laurel Hill Cemetery, 142 Fed. 552 (1910 C. C.), Rosehill
Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 352 Ill. 11, 185 N. E. 170, 87 A. L. R. 742 (1933) ; New
Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 11 La. Ann. 244 (1856); Hardin v. Huckaby, 6 La.
App. 640 (1927); Barnes v. Hathorn, 54 Me. 124 (1866); Monk v. Packard, 71
Me. 309, 36 Am. Rep. 315 (1880); Dunn v. Austin, 77 Texas 139, 11 S. W. 1125
(1889); Robert v. Les Cure et Margullier, Rap. Jud. Quebec 9 C. S. 489 (1896).
23 Reid v. Memphis Memorial Park, 5 Tenn. App. 105 (1927).
24 Hardin v. Huckaby, 6 La. App. 640 (1928).
25 Wahl v. Methodist Episcopal Cemetery Ass'n. of Williamstown, 197 Pa.
197, 46 Atl. 913 (1900).
20 Sutton v. Findlay Cemetery Ass'n., 270 Ill. 11, 110 N. E. 315 (1915).
27 Elliott v. Ferguson, 37 Texas Civ. App. 40,83 S. W. 56 (1904).
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CRIMINAL LAW - FORMER JEOPARDY - WHEN JEOPARDY ADHERES.
-No person, by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, and by similar amendments in the various constitutions
of the forty-eight states, is subject to be twice placed in jeopardy of
life or limb for the same criminal offense. The fact that the United
States has a dual form of government wherein both the federal and
state governments are sovereign in their own right, gives rise to a
peculiar qualification of. former jeopardy in this country. Where each
sovereignty makes a specific act a crime, assuming they each have the
power to do so, conviction or acquittal by one does not give to the
convicted or acquitted an immunity from successful prosecution by the
other.' Otherwise, if it in law and in fact exists, a former conviction or
acquittal for the identical offense now charged is everywhere in the
United States a complete bar to any further prosecution of the accused.
But at what point in the procedure of a trial does jeopardy attach?
What bearing does the fact that the indictment or information is in-
valid have'on the attaching of jeopardy? What role does the failure
to arraign a defendant and to have him plead, have on his being placed
in jeopardy? What effect is there on jeopardy already attached when
the trial judge discharges a juror or the jury? And lastly, what effect
does the lack of jurisdiction in the court have on the attaching of
jeopardy? These questions are to be treated broadly in the above order,
and present the scope of this note.
Jeopardy attaches, according to the general rule, when a person has
been placed on trial on a valid indictment or information, has been
arraigned and has pleaded, and a jury has been impanelled and sworn
in a court of competent jurisdiction. 2 There are many qualifications
of this rule, some of which hereinafter will be noted. The reason for
this holding is, broadly, that at that time a person's jeopardy, that is,
danger and peril to life or limb, is real; and the constitutional amend-
ments referring to jeopardy contemplate precisely that reality. Jeopardy,
as used in the constitutions of this country, is construed as a prohibition
not against being twice punished, but against being twice placed in
danger of being punished for the same offense. In Maryland,3 it is held
that the plea of former jeopardy is not available where there has been
no verdict rendered by the jury in the former trial. In Mississippi, 4
1 United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 67 L. ed. 314 (1922).
2 United States v. Van Vliet, 23 Fed. 35 (District Court, Mich. 1885); Savell
v. State, 150 Ala. 97, 43 So. 201 (1907) ; Patterson v. Police Court, 123 Cal. 453,
56 Pac. 105 (1899); O'Donnell v. People, 224 Ili. 218, 79 N. E. 639 (1906); Gil-
lespie v. State, 168 Ind. 298, 80 N. E. 829 (1907); Paul v. Benzie Circuit judge,
163 Mich. 543, 128 X. W. 739 (1910); State v. Sommers, 60 Minn. 90, 61 N. W.
907 (1895); State v. Hows, 31 Utah 168, 87 Pac. 163 (1906); State v. Herold, 68
Wash. 654, 123 Pac. 1076 (1912).
8 Anderson v. State, 86 Md. 479, 38 Atl. 937 (1897).
4 Roberts v. State, 72 Miss. 728, 18 So. 481 (1895).
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New Jersey,5 and South Carolina, 6 by their constitutions, former jeop-
ardy may not be pleaded in a second trial for the same offense unless
there has been a conviction or acquittal in the first. In Roberts v. State
of Mississippi, supra, the court stated that such a clause in its consti-
tution changes the old rule and "wisely puts an end to the unmeritorious
escape of persons charged with crime, who had been technically, not
really, tried. It was put into the constitution in the interest of the due
and proper administration of the criminal law." The holding of these
four states represents a decided minority. And, in regard to the remain-
ing questions of this note as set forth above, the holding of these four
states simplifies the answering of them. Bishop in his treatise on criminal
law criticizes the minority ruling on the grounds that its effect is to
make these constitutional amendments referring to jeopardy read that
no man shall be twice "tried" for the same offense, thus confounding
the danger or jeopardy of the thing and the thing itself.7 To conclude
this first question, in those criminal cases where a jury is waived, the
peril of jeopardy arises before a judge acting alone, under the same
circumstances as before a judge and jury.8
It is the general rule that jeopardy cannot attach if the indictment
or information is substantially invalid .for one reason or another.9 But
out of this rule arises a situation about which there is a conflict of
judicial opinion. In the case of United States v. Ball,10 the defendant
was charged with murder in an indictment lacking the requisite full-
ness and precision. The defendant, nevertheless, pleaded to the merits
and was subsequently acquitted. Thereafter, the defendant was again
brought before the court for the same offense, and this time he pleaded
former jeopardy. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
a genera1 verdict of acquittal upon the issue of not guilty to an in-
dictment charging murder, and not objected to before the verdict as
insufficient in that respect, is a bar to a second indictment. The court
felt that since the acquittal had been gained through a meritorious de-
fense, and a discharge did not result because of the insufficiency of the
indictment, it would obviously violate the prohibition against being
twice placed in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense. In this
view, a minority in the United States concur either by statute or de-
cision.". It is conceded by the minority that when the defendant is
5 Smith v. New Jersey, 41 N. J. L. 598 (1879).
0 State v. Wise, 33 S. C. 582, 12 S. E. 556 (1879).
7 1 BisHoP, NEW CmmNAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) 1018.
8 People v. Garcia, 120 Cal. App. 767, 7 Pac. (2d) 401 (1932); State v.
Pittsburg Paving Brick Co., 117 Kan. 192, 230 Pac. 1035 (1924).
9 16 C. J. 376.
10 163 U. S. 662, 41 L. ed. 300 (1896).
11 Tufts v. State, 41 Fla. 663, 27 So. 218 (1899); State v. Holton, 88 Minn,
171, 92 N. W. 541 (1902); State v. Hall, 141 Mo. App. 701, 125 S. W. 229 (1910);
State v. Littschke, 27 Ore. 189, 40 Pac. 167 (1895); Jones v. Morris, 97 Va. 43,
33 S. E. 377 (1899); State v. Burais, 54 Wash. 113, 102 Pac. 886 (1909).
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relieved of the consequences of a criminal indictment because of his
successful attack on its insufficiency, he cannot later claim former jeop-
ardy when prosecuted anew for the same offense.12 This follows be-
cause the defendant's course throughout the proceeding was unmeri-
torious. The majority of the states hold that where the indictment or
information is too defective to form the basis for a judgment, a trial
thereunder cannot afford jeopardy, as against a good indictment charg-
ing the same offense.1 8 A conviction rendered on a fatally defective in-
dictment or information is not void, but voidable by writ of error.
When it has been set aside, however, the former conviction is a nullity
and cannot form the basis for a plea of former jeopardy. Where the ac-
cused has been released because of the fatal defect in the indictment
or information, or acquitted, such afi indictment or information is a
nullity and does not preclude the issuing of another indictment for the
same offense. Since in both instances, the indictment is a nullity, the
majority considers it is a contradiction of terms to say that a person
has been in jeopardy by an indictment under which he could not be
convicted.
Decisions which deal with the question of the effect of a failure of
arraignment and plea are not numerous. In United States v. Riley,14
a jury had been impanelled and sworn before the defendant had been
arraigned and made his plea. On discovery of this fact, the jury was.
dismissed, arraignment was made, and the defendant entered a plea
of former jeopardy. It was held that the defendant had not been in
jeopardy and that the former proceeding was a mere nullity. That the
arraignment and plea are essential to a criminal proceeding, and until
a person has been arraigned and has pleaded, he is not in jeopardy
though a jury had been impanelled and sworn to try him, is consistently
held.1 5 Under such circumstances, as the cases bring out, it becomes the
duty of the court to dismiss the jury, to arraign the defendant and have
him enter his plea, and to then re-impanel and re-swear the jury to try
him. The case of State of -Washington v. Kinghorn,1 6 presents an op-
12 United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 41 L. ed. 300 (1896); State v. God-
dard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S. W. 697 (1901); Commonwealth v. Willcox, 111 Va. 849,
69 S. E. 1027 Q1911).
18 Sims v. State, .146 Ala. 521, 41 So. 413 (1906); O'Brien v. State, 39 Ariz.
298, 6 Pac. (2d) 421 (1932); Mclntire v. State, 151 Ark. 458, 236 S. W. 619
(1932); Culpepper v. State, 44 Ga. App. 351, 161 S. E. 849 (1932); Shepler v.
State, 114 Ind. 194, 16 N. E. 521 (1888); State v. Brown, 110 La. 591, 34 So.
698 (1903); Kenny v. State, 121 Md. 120, 87 AtI. 1109 (1913); Timon v. State,
34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 363, 30 S. W. 808 (1895); State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609, 239 Pac.
25 (1925).
14 5 Blatchf. 204, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 164 (1864).
15 Prince v. State, 140 Ala. 158, 37 So. 171 (1904); Peavey v. State, I3 Ga.
119, 111 S. E. 420 (1922); State v. Heard, 49 La. Ann. 375, 21 So. 632 (1897);
State v. Bronkel, 5 N. D. 507, 67 N. W. 680 (1896); Yerger v. State, 41 S. W.
621 (Tex. Cr. Rep. 1897).
16 56 Wash. 131, 105 Pac. 234 (1909).
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posite view holding that the mere fact that a defendant has not been
arraigned and a plea entered before the jury is impanelled and sworn,
is an irregularity that may be rectified during the trial without re-
impanelling and re-swearing a jury.
Where the trial judge discharges a juror or the jury, the plea of
former jeopardy is not available providing there existed a necessity
for such discharge. This principle is generally followed. 17 In United
States v. Perez,'8 it was so held in the following language: "We think
that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, when-
ever in its opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration,
there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public- justice
would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise -a sound discretion
on the subject, and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which
would render it proper to interfere." Thus, necessity and public justice
unattaches jeopardy which, by the general rule discussed at the out-
set of this article, would otherwise have continued; and in legal con-
templation, it is as though the trial had never been. Whether the neces-
sity exists to discharge a juror or the jury is a matter of discretion
with the trial judge. If there is a clear abuse of this discretion, the ac-
cused is considered as acquitted by reason of the unnecessary dis-
charge of the jury. 1 But where the accused consents to, or is blamable
for the discharge of the jury without a sufficient legal reason, he waives
or loses his right to subsequently successfully plead former jeopardy.20
As was observed in the quotation from United States v. Perez, the cir-
cumstances which give rise to a necessity to discharge a juror or the
jury are of a various nature. Sickness of a juror, the judge, or of one
in the immediate family of either, the impossibility of the jury to
agree, subsequent discovery of a juror's prejudice and the insanity of
a juror are illustrations that do give rise to this necessity.
17 Spelce v. State, 20 Ala. App. 412, 103 So. 694 (1924); Franklin v. State,
149 Ark. 346, 233 S. W. 688 (1921); Rittenberry v. State, 30 Ga. App. 289, 117
S. E. 765 (1923); Harlan v. State, 190 Ind. 322, 130 N. E. 413 (1921); State v.
Keppen, 191 Iowa 19, 180 N. W. 307 (1920); State v. Slorah, 118 Me. 203, 106
Atl. 768 (1919); Smith v. State, 158 Miss. 335, 128 So. 891 (1930); Quinton v.
State, 112 Neb. 684, 200 N. W. 881 (1924) ; State v. Chandler, 128 Ore. 204, 274
Pac. 303 (1929); Holt v. State, 160 Tenn. 366, 24 S. W. (2d) 886 (1930); State
v. Shelton, 116 W. Va. 75, 178 S. E. 633 (1935).
18 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 579, 6 L. ed. 165 (1824).
19 Bell v. State, 44 Ala. 393 (1870); Riley v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 204,
227 S. W. 146 (1921); People v. Brosky, 222 Mich. 651, 193 N. W. 194 (1923).
20 Pope v. People, 228 Ala. 609, 155 So. 79 (1934); People v. Baillie, 133
Cal. App. 508, 24 Pac. (2d) 528 (1933); State v. Ball, 34 N. M. 254, 280 Pac.
256 (1929); People v. Freiberg, 243 N. Y. S. 590, 137 Misc. 314 (1930); Allen
v. State, 13 Okla. Cr. Rep. 533, 165 Pac. 745 (1917); Commonwealth v. Barille,
270 Pa. 388, 113 AtL 663 (1921).
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Jurisdiction is the power lawfully existing to hear and judicially
determine a cause.2 ' A criminal proceeding in a court which is without
jurisdiction to try the case is a nullity, and one convicted or acquitted
in such a court has no right to plead former jeopardy in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. This principle has the support of the
authorities. 22 Since conviction is impossible in a court lacking jurisdic-
tion, jeopardy is considered likewise an impossibility. Thus, where the
court has no power to determine the merits of an offense charged, or
owes its existence to an unconstitutional act of the legislature, or is
holding over a term of court unauthorizedly, or for some other reason
has no power to hear the crime charged, no matter how far the pro-
ceedings have progressed, the accused has never been in jeopardy.
Jurisdiction over the person is also essential. Each state in the United
States is sovereign. Accordingly, if A is acquitted in Georgia for a mur-
der he committed in Florida, he cannot successfully enter a plea of
former jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense in'
Florida.28 And in the individual states, it is held that the proper forum
for the trial of a crime committed in the state lies in the county where
the crime was perpetrated. Consequently, an acquittal in a county
where the crime was not committed is no bar to a successful prosecu-"
tion in the county where it was.24 Only that court in the county which
is the situs of the crime has jurisdiction over the person who com-
mitted it.
Edwin Daniel O'Leary.
EVIDENCE- BLOOD TESTS TO DIsPRovE PATERNITY.- By a -review
of all the cases in which paternity is disputed, it can readily be seen
that blood tests are gaining recognition and importance in the courts
of law. Before reviewing the cases concerned with the subject, it might
be well to. see just what these blood grouping tests consist of, and how
they can be used as evidence in bastardy proceedings.
21 People ex rel. Gaynor v. McKane, 78 Hun 154 (N. Y. 1894).
22 Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 51 L. ed. 1084 (1907); Stoner v.
State, 7 Ind. App. 620, 35 N. E. 133 (1893); Cook v. State, 77 Miss. 800, 27 So.
605 (1900); Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. Rep. 219, 63 S. W. 1009 (1901); State v.
Bruce, 68 Vt. 183, 34 At]. 701 (1896); State v. Hubbell, 18 Wash. 482, 51 Pac.
1039.
23 Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167, 47 So. 4 (1908); Phillips v. People, 55 Ill.
429 (1870).
24 Crowder v. State, 69 Ark. 330, 63 S. W. 669 (1901); Campbell v. People,
109 Ill. 565, 50 Am. Rep. 621 (1884); State v. Bacon, 170 Mo: 161, 70 S. W. 473
(1902).
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Doctor Harriet H. Hyman,' authority on blood tests relates that
there are two cellular properties in the blood, known as aggultinogens
and agglutinins. When this fact was first discovered in 1900 by Karl
Landsteiner, the human blood was classified into four groups, known
as 0, A, B, and AB. In 1928 it was discovered that other agglutinins
existed and these were designated as M and N. This made possible the
classification of blood into twelve distinct groups:
AM OM BMN
AN ON ABM
AMN OMN ABN
BM BN ABMN
The blood group of a particular individual depends upon the blood
group of the parents. The laws governing the inheritance of these blood
groups are so exact that it can be determined by examination of two
parents of what blood group their children will be. If the blood group
of the mother be known and the blood group of her offspring, the blood
group of the father can be predicted by that of the offspring. All factors
come in pairs. If the blood of the. child belongs to group MN, it is
known that one of the parents must belong fo group M and the other
parent belong to group N. If the child belongs to group M, the sub-
stance must come from both parents. The tests in reference to blood
examination have been extensive and accurate, according to authorities,
and if the parents belong to the M group, the child cannot inherit the
N group.
In a bastardy case,2 Doctor Hyman recently testified as an expert,
relating that blood tests were made of the mothej, the child, and the
alleged father. The accused male was found to belong to group AN, and
the mother AM, and the child to group AM. On the basis of such ex-
amination, the defendant could not possibly have been the father of
the child. Any father of the baby must have substances M in his blood
because the child gets its M substance from both parents. The ac-
cused in this case belonged to group N and lacked substance M. Were
he the father of the child, the blood of the latter would be of the
group MN.
In this case, the Ohio court for the first time recognized the value
of blood tests in evidence as applying in a negative manner, ruling
that where a man is accused by an unmarried female of being the
father of her unborn child and after the birth of the child an expert
whose qualifications are not questioned, makes a blood test of the
blood of the mother of the child, of the alleged father, and of the
child itself, the result of such test is competent evidence and may be
introduced for whatever weight it may have to prove the non-paternity
of the accused.
1 2 Ohio Law J. 203 (1936).
2 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N. E. (2nd) 428 (1938).
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-Professor Wigmore in his exhaustive work on Evidence, brings out
the logic upon which the blood tests are based by using the following
analogy from ordinary commercial life: "A customer of the B6lleville
Bank comes to the bank president on Tuesday with a $10 bill, handed
to him on Monday before, by one of the tellers. This bill has turned
out to be a counterfeit. The president would like to know which one
of the tellers gave this bill to the customer; but the customer does not
remember which teller he dealt with. The banker, referring to the rec-
ords of the bank, finds that on Monday each teller was supposel to re-
ceive for distribution packages of bills of $1, $5, $10, $20, and $50
denominations; but the records show that on this Monday Tellers
Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 did receive the usual packages, but by inad-
venture Teller Number 5 was given no $10 package. It follows that
Teller Number S is exonerated from having been the one to pass out
the counterfeit $10 bill. It does not, however, follow that the passing
of that bill can be fixed upon either Tellers Number 1, 2, 3, or 4; it
might have been any one of them but no particular one can be fixed
upon by that evidence." 8
Wigmore shows by this example, in one specific biological trait,
blood groups, scientific opinion is now in accord in accepting the fact
that there is a causative relation between the trait of the progenitor
and the trait of the progeny. That is, the blood composition of a
child may be some evidence as to the child's parents. But, as all au-
thorities agree, thus far, this trait in its present state of scientific dis-
covery, can be used only negatively - to evidence that a particular
man is not the father of a particular child.
From the illustration given by Wigmore it can be seen that in a
bastardy case, if the child had blood of the AB group, and the al-
leged father blood of the. 0 group, he could not possibly be the father
any more than Teller Number 5, supra, could have handed out the
counterfeit money. At the same time, four other men subjected to the
blood test and each of them having either type A, B, or AB, could
not be proven to be the actual father of the child.
For this test only one or a few drops of blood are needed in order
that the laboratory technician be able to determine the group within
which it falls. The test itself is convenient, painless, and in no way
prejudicial to the health of the donor, yet many courts seem to dis-
prove of it for this very reason; or at least the courts take the posi-
tion that they have no right to order parties concerned to submit to
such tests.
In Commonwealth v. English,4 the court held that in criminal cases
such as prosecution for fornication and bastardy, courts have no power
3 WIoMORE ox EviDENcE, Supp. to 2nd Ed., § 165a (1934).
A 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 278 (1936).
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to compel the prosecutrix or other witnesses to submit their bodies
for blood tests. The court went so far as to say that refusal to take
such a test could not be emphasized against any party to the case.
The case of Taylor v. Diamond,5 held that the court had no right
whatsoever to order any witness to submiit to the taking of blood tests.
We find an interesting conflict upon this point even in courts higher
than trial courts within the same state. In Arais v. Kalensnikoff,8 a
California District Court of Appeal held that whenever it should be
relevant to the prosecution of the defense in an illegitimacy action, the
trial court, by order, might direct the mother, her child and the de-,
fendant to submit to one or more blood tests to determine whether
or not the defendant could be excluded as being the father of the
child. This court took the view that such tests should be admissible in
evidence in cases where definite exclusion is established, and decided
that the courts should take judicial notice of recognized blood group-
ings, plus the results derived therefrom.
One year later, upon appeal, the Supreme Court of California, in
the same case,7 decided that blood groupings such as were used as
evidence in this case could not be accepted as conclusive evidence that
an alleged father is not in fact- the father of the child whose paternity
was in dispute. This court took the view that such tests were not
scientifically proven to be reliable and hence could not be used in the
way of evidence.
In the Appeal of Ketcham,8 a like attitude was taken by the court
when it held that in a proceeding to establish paternity of a child born
out of wedlock, admission of results of blood grouping tests over the
objection of the alleged father, was error because such tests could not
be proven to be accurate in result.
Other courts are less prejudiced against the taking of blood tests.
In this class may be put the courts of South Dakota, for in State v.
Damm,9 the court decided that the result of blood tests made by
competent persons for the ascertainment of blood types or groupings
was admissible in evidence upon the issue of paternity of a child, but
it was purely a discretional matter.-The court held that modem medical
science is agreed upon transmissibility of blood characteristics to such
extent that it can be accepted as an unquestioned scientific fact that,
if blood groupings of parents are known, the blood group of the off-
spring can be necessarily determined, or that, if blood groupings of
the mother and child are known, it can be accepted as a positively
5 241 App. Div. 888, 269 N. Y. S. 165 (1934).
G 67 P. (2nd) 1059 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App., 1937).
7 74 P. (2nd) 1043 (Cal. Super. Ct., 1938).
s 4 N. Y. S. (2nd) 786, 254 N. Y. App. Div. 776 (1938).
9 104 A. L. R. 430, 266 N. W. 667 (1938).
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established fact that the blood group of the father could not have been
a certain specific characteristic group, and the court at his discretion
might order such a test made for what it is worth.
The New York court, as it decided the case of Beuschel v. Manor-
ity,' 0 could be put in this same class when it held that the prosecutrix
might or might not submit to the taking of her blood and that of her
child's for the purpose of blood grouping tests to prove paternity, but
that no matter what the result of such tests might be, the test would
plainly determine nothing.
Following the decision of Beuschel Case, the State of New York
enacted a statute as follows: "Whenever it shall be relevant to the
prosecution of defense of an action, the court, by order, shall direct
any party to the action and the child of any such party to submit
to *one or more blood grouping tests, the specimens for the purpose
to be collected by duly qualified physicians and under such restrictions
and directions as to the court or judge shall seem proper. The order
for such blood grouping tests may also direct that the testimony of
the rersons so examined may be taken by deposition pursuant to this
article." 11 It is contended that this statute indicated a legislative in-
tent that this new species of evidence should be available in any litiga-
tion in any court of the State when its employment might conceivably
throw light on the justice of either of the opposing contentions.
Apparently disregarding the statute, the court in Flippen v. Mein-
hold 12 held that it was not entitled to order the defendant to sub-
mit to blood grouping tests since positive results of the test would fur-
nish no satisfactory proof of the defendant's paternity, for which pur-
pose the test was sought.
In another New York case, Thomson v. Elliott,13 the court held
he was constrained to deny the respondent's motion for an order direct-
ing the mother, and child, when born, to submit to blood tests for the
purpose of determining paternity, because of the decision found in
Beuschel v. Manority.14
In spite of the fact that a large group of courts still apparently dis-
regard entirely, or do not put any weight in the results of blood tests,
we find some that are advanced enough to accept the results as valu-
able parts of evidence. Like the Ohio Court in State v. Wright,15 they
consider these scientific findings to have merit, and as such to be ad-
missible in disputed paternity cases.
10 272 N. Y. S. 165, 241 App. Div. 888 (1934).
11 104 A. L. R. 448 (1938).
12 156 Misc. Rep. 451, 282 N. Y. S. 444 (1935).
13 152 Misc. Rep. 188, 272 N. Y. S. 898 (1934).
14 241 App. Div. 888, 272 N. Y. S. 165 (1934).
15 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N. E. (2nd) 428 (1938).
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The court in the case of In re Swahn's Will Is determined that the
courts will judicially notice that the principle underlying blood group-
ing examinations is that certain characteristics of blood of a parent
perpetuate themselves in blood of the offspring, and that results of
such tests are therefore potentially relevant in the determination of
paternity or maternity, and therefore admissible in evidence.
Likewise in Commonwealth v. Sammarellie,17 the court said with
reference to blood grouping tests, that: "Proof of non-paternity by this
means depends on showing that according to the laws of inheritance
of determining factors, the child could not be the descendant of both
the woman and the man in question; and hence since it is assumed to
be the child of the woman, it is consequently proved to be the child
of a man other that the accused. The chances for a man wrongfully
implicated of proving his innocence are about one to seven, or there
are six chances to one that he will be unable to do so. If, however, the
blood group of a man is known, it is possible to tell with greater ac-
curacy what his chances may be of proving non-paternity, since the
various percentages in each blood group are approximately known."
This court then held that on the theory that the verdict found in the
lower court was against the weight of evidence, a new trial should
be granted to a defendant found guilty of bastardy where uncontra-
dicted testimony of the defendant's expert witness revealed that the
Landsteiner Blood Test indicated that the defendant could not pos-
sibly have been the father of the child.
We find that judicial bodies are not the only ones concerned with the
matter of blood tests as matter of evidence, because legislative bodies
in a few states have, of late, taken the matter into consideration. Bills
on the subject have been considered in Illinois, Montana, New Jersey,
and Ohio, but all were apparently tabled for the time being. However,
subsequent to the enactment of the New York Statute on blood tests,
the Wisconsin legislature went a step farther in passing a law which is
now in effect and reads as follows: "Whenever it shall be relevant to
the prosecution of defense in an illegitimacy action, the trial court, by,
order, may direct that the complainant, her child, and the defendant
submit to one or more blood tests to determine whether or not the de-
fendant can be excluded as being the father of the child. The result
of the test shall be receivable in evidence but only in cases where
definite exclusion is established. The test shall be made by duly quali-
fied physicians, or duly qualified persons, not to exceed three, to be
appointed by the court and to be paid by the county. Such experts
shall be subject to cross-examination by both parties after the court
has caused them to disclose their findings to the court, or to the court
and jury. Whenever the court orders such blood tests to be taken and
16 158 Misc. Rep. 17, 285 N. Y. S. 234 (1936).
17 17 Pa. Dist. & C. 229 (1931).
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one of the parties shall refuse to submit to such test, such fact shall
be disclosed upon the trial unless good cause is shown to the con-
trary." is
It seems from this research that the courts are in conflict as to
whether or not blood grouping tests shall be admissible in evidence
even in modern law. The legislative groups, however, are indicating a
decided trend to favor the admissibility of such evidence as long as
it is used to prove that an alleged father cannot be the parent of the
child in question. Then since the courts are apparently not advanced
enough to accept this type of scientific proof of non-paternity, we may
find legislative groups taking the decision of this matter from the hands
of the courts in the future, and enacting statutes which will determine
blood grouping tests to be reliable and acceptable as matters of evidence
in paternity cases.
Richard F. Sullivan.
Lm DETECTOR - ADMISSIBILITY As EVIDENCE.-In the past decade
science has made many advances -many of which have been used in
the detection of criminals. Great *difficulty was experienced by the pro-
ponents of the various implements and methods of detection in having
their apparatus and findings accepted by the courts as evidence. The
courts rightfully have refused to accept any scientific evidence until the
theory on which it is based has been universally accepted by the scien-
tific world as being perfected. Today there are many crime laboratories
throughout the country endeavoring by experiment, to perfect some
such theory.
In recent years there has been much progress made by men like
Marston, Larson, Keeler, and Summers in the use of the "lie detector."
Keeler is the proponent of the polygraph or blood pressure method.
The polygraph is an apparatus that records the changes in the subject's
heart action and in some instances registers the changes of respiration.
The galvanometer method was fostered by the late Rev. Walter G.
Summers, S. J. and differs from the other methods in that it records
changes produced by the emotional disturbances on the activity of the
sweat glands.
The first case to come up on appeal in which the admissibility of
the "lie detector" was contested was Frye v. United States.' In 1923
Frye was convicted of murder in the second degree. The only error as-
signed was the refusal of the court to accept the offer of the defense
18 Wisconsin Code § 166.105 (1937).
1 Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 Fed. 1013, 24 A. L. R. 145
(1923).
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counsel to have an expert witness testify as to the result of a "lie de-
tector" test made upon the defendant. At that time there were ample
grounds for the court to rule out this evidence as being incompetent
since both the scientific and legal articles written at the time were to
the effect that the apparatus was still in the experimental stage. John
A. Larson in his address to the American Bar Association stated:
"... there is no test in its present state which is suitable for the posi-
tive identification of deception and suitable for court procedure." 2
Ten years later a defendant in a robbery case attempted to prove
by the testimony of Professor Leonard Keeler of the Northwestern
University Crime Detection Laboratory the result of a deception test
upon the defendant with the Keeler Polygraph. The purpose was to
show that the defendant was not in the city of the scene of the crime
at the time it was committed and was therefore not guilty.3 The Wis-
consin Court refused to permit this testimony to be admitted as evidence
basing its decision on the Frye case on the ground that this method
of detecting deception was still in its infancy.
In March, 1938, Raymond Kenny was prosecuted for robbery in the
second degree as a second, offender in the Queens County Court of
New York.4 County Court Judge Colden overruled the objection of
the people to the admission of testimohy showing the accused's reaction
when subject to interrogation under the "lie detector."
The Judge says after stating the difficulty experienced in having
admitted into evidence the testimony of handwriting experts, psychia-
trists, etc., ". . . today their right to admission is firmly entrenched
in our law. . . . Despite the fact that such experts frequently differ
in their conclusions, their testimony is received in evidence and it is
left to a jury to determine, which of either expert or experts, they are
going to believe or accept." 5
County Court Judge Colden seems to have been impressed by the
statements of the Rev. Walter G. Summers, S. J. as to the merits of
his apparatus, the psychogalvanometer. In one laboratory test 271 per-
sons were examined and 49 of the 50 guilty persons were detected by
this procedure. In the accomplice group of 102 persons 100 were de-
tected. In the innocent group of 119 persons all were detected. In ac-
tual examination of persons involved in 49 criminal cases the results
indicated one hundred per cent. accuracy.'
When one looks at these figures it is easy to see why Judge Colden
was impressed and permitted the testimony to be used as evidence;
2 47 A. B. A. Rep. 619. (1922).
3 State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 351; 246 N. W. 314, 86 A. L. R. 611 (1933).
4 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1938).
5 Id. at 351.
G Id. at 350.
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but the following November another County Judge refused to be so
impressed and would not permit a defendant in a murder trial to be
removed from Kings County to Bronx County in order to undergo an
examination by Father Summers. Upon appeal the New York Court
of Appeals upheld the County Court saying that the denial of the
motion could not be regarded as error where there is no proof of general
scientific recognition of the efficiency of such a test.7
Thus we have the story of the courts in refusing to admit the testi-
mony of experts on the use of the "lie detector" and its results as evi-
dence. It it well to note that in each one of these cases the courts have
cited the Frye case as the authority on which they base their finding.
These courts then refer us to the various law review articles that were
written at the time of the Frye decision; and after more than ten years,
the courts are using the same authority regardless of the fact that
science may have progressed during that time.
In State v. Bohner, Leonarde. Keeler had sufficient faith in his
Polygraph to desire to use it and testify according to -the results that
he obtained. But the court preferred to follow the earlier case and cites
us to articles that were written in 1923 and 1924.8 In one of these ar-
ticles Professor Poffenberger of Columbia University stated that the
blood pressure and other deceptive tests had not as yet advanced out
of the experimental stages. 9 This was written in 1924 and the Wis-
consin case was decided in 1933.
In an excerpt by Professor Keeler appearing in The Science of Judi-
cial Proof 10 he states that the exact statistics cannot be derived in ac-
tual cases because of the difficulty of verifying all test results. Then,
"... in criminal cases approximately 62 per cent. of those giving test
results indicating guilt have made verified confessions or otherwise
have been proven guilty. In three cases brought to the writer's attention,
individuals diagnosed as innocent were later proven guilty, but in no
case has an individual been diagnosed guilty who was later definitely
proved innocent. In approximately 10 per cent. of the cases the results
are of such nature that no definite diagnosis can be. made." 11 Again
he says, "The practical uses of the polygraph (blood pressure method)
have been fully established by the experience at the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory of Northwestern University - not only in police
inquiries, but in personnel administration: . Y12
7 People v. Forte, 279 N. Y..204, 18 N. E. (2d) 31, 119 A. L. R. 1198 (1938).
8 (1924) 33 YAmE L. J. 771; (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 302; (1924) HARv. L.
REV. 1138; (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 428.
9 (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 428.
10 WIGmoRE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF,770 (1937).
11 Id. at 774
12 Id. at 776.
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By the practical uses of the polygraph it is meant the use it is put
to in preliminary examinations and investigation of the criminal. Dr.
Larson is still of the belief that there are too many obstacles for its
admission as evidence in the court room and that its real value is more
for the sake of preliminary investigation in aiding the police to obtain
a confession from the criminal.13
Wigmore points out the main obstacles to the use of such testimony.
First, the same conditions do not exist in the laboratory that exist in the
court room; secondly, the number of instances that would have to be
compiled in order to make a generalization; thirdly, these generaliza-
tions would be true in the general only and would not be usable to
diagnose the individual; fourthly, the testimonial scientist in the court
room can rarely possess the necessary objective basis which the physi-
cal scientist almost always has, viz. the test of the observed fact.' 4
This observation may be applied to all forms of scientific testimony.
We have experts appearing in court rooms daily and giving conflicting
testimony. This is especially true in the case of handwriting experts.
Nevertheless such testimony is submitted to the jury and they are per-
mitted to decide which of the data submitted is the most competent.
County Court Judge Fitzgerald in the Forte case followed the tech-
nique of the previous Wisconsin case and based his decision on earlier
writings on the topic. Of course from the facts its would not have been
difficult for the jury to find the defendant guilty of the crime but it
would have been an excellent opportunity to test the veracity, as it
were, of the "lie detector." The jury would be permitted to compare
the results of the test with the actual circumstances as they are placed
in evidence by the State.
Although Judge Colden did not base his decision on the precedent
followed by the other courts, we prefer in this instance, to follow the
logic of Judge Colden which has its foundation on data at his disposal
rather than materials written ten years ago. We do not say that the
results of the "lie detector" are faultless but rather that there may be
a possibility that it is more trustworthy than it was when Frye was
convicted of murder in the second degree.
Edward F. Grogan, Jr.
PROCEDURAL STEPS IN OHIO APPELLATE PRACTICE.-The prosecu-
tion of an appeal from a lower court, generally the Court of Common
Pleas, to the Court of Appeals in Ohio, presents a somewhat weighty
problem to many seasoned lawyers, as well as to the novitiate. It is the
13 LARSON, LYING AND ITs DETEcTION 405 (1932).
14 WIGomRE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 692 (1937).
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object of this note to set forth the fundamental and yet practical as-
pects of appellate practice as far as the introduction of the particular
litigation into the Court of Appeals.
In 1931, the Judicial Council of Ohio appointed a committee to
draft a proposal 'for the simplification of appellate procedure, such
committee working in conjunction with the Ohio State Bar Association.'
The final draft of the proposal was introduced into the legislature in
1933, passed in April, 1935, and became effective January 1, 1936.
. Under the old practice, as was the rule at common law, it was nec-
essary to take exceptions to all rulings in the lower court in order to
save such rulings, in case of error, for review in the appellate court.
Today, under the GENERAL CODE, 2 the old common law technical prac-
tice of stopping the trial while exceptions were taken and noted, has
been abolished. It is now only necessary for the complaining attorney
to make his objection, or motion, as the case may be, thus calling the
court's attention to the specific point in issue. The theory of this modern
practice is that since the trial proceedings are a matter of record, the
mere calling of the court's attention to a point by motion or objection
is sufficient to save the question for appeal on the alleged error.
Now, a fundamental basic condition, preceding a prosecution of ap-
peal, is that the order of the court from which the appeal is being taken
must be final. This is a question of interpretation and it is necessary
to refer to formerly adjudicated cases to determine just what is and
what is not a final order. According to the G. C. 12223-2, "An order
affecting a substantial right in an action, when in effect it determines
the action and prevents a judgment, or an order affecting a substantial
right made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in
an action after judgment, is a final order which may be reviewed, af-
firmed, modified, or reversed . . .Y The foregoing section supersedes
G. C. 12258 which says, "An order affecting a substantial right in an
action, when in effect it determines the action and prevents a judg-
ment is a final order.'? . .. In the recent case of Fulton v. Madlener,3
decided in November, 1937, the court said, "A final order is com-
prehended by the term 'judgment' as expressed in article IV, Section
6, of the Ohio Constitution, 4 providing that the Court of Appeals has
1 Fas" REPORT or THE JUDIcIAL Coucm or Omo, (1931) p. 15.
2 Omo GENEmAL CODE, § 11560. (General Code hereinafter referred to as G.
C.) ". . . An exception shall not be necessary, at any stage or step of the case or
matter, to Jay a foundation for review whenever a matter has been called to the
attention of the court by objection, motion, or otherwise and the court has ruled
thereon. Error can be predicated upon erroneous statements contained in the
charge, not induced by the complaining party, without exception being taken to
the charge."
3 57 Ohio App. 345, 14 N. E. (2d) 27 (1937).
4 ". . . The courts of appeals shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto,
mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition and procedendo, and appellate jurisdiction
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appellate jurisdiction, but the final order must have the same degree of
finality as a judgment." In that case, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
the statute, G. C. 12223-2, supra, unconstitutional insofar as the or-
der for a new trial, setting aside a general verdict, was considered a
"fiial order," since a final order to be reviewable by the Court of Ap-
peals, must have the same finality as a judgment.5 The Court further
said, that ".. . the granting of a motion for a new trial is not a final
order or judgment so as to be reviewable by the Court of Appeals since
it does not result in the final determination of the rights of the parties,
or determine the action notwithstanding a substantial right is affected
in that a judgment predicated on the verdict is prevented. . ." Thus
the importance of establishing a "final order" in predicating an appeal
is an obvious fundamental condition precedent. 5"
in the trial of chancery cases, and, to review, affirm, modify, or reverse the
judgments of the courts of common pleas, superior courts, and other courts of
record within the district as may be provided by law, and judgments of the courts
of appeals shall be final in all cases, except ... "
5 See "Granting Motion for New Trial as Final Order Where Court Abused
Discretion." John R. Baskin; 15 Ohio Opinions 596 (1939).
5" Statute declaring ". . . an order vacating or setting aside a general verdict
of a jury and ordering a new trial is a final order.", held unconstitutional as not
within the meaning of the word "Judgment" as required by Art. IV, Sec. 6, Ohio
Constitution. Thus, as order vacating or setting aside a general verdict of a jury
and ordering a new trial-is not a final order. Hoffman v. Knollman, 135 Ohio St.
170, 20 N. E. (2d) 221 (1939).
An order of the trial court overruling defendant's motion, filed after defendant's
motion for a new trial had been granted and verdict vacated, for judgment on the
pleadings, exclusive of cross petition, was not a final order. J. F. Harig Co. v.
City of Cincinnati, (Ohio App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 540.
In an action where the ultimate relief sought is an injunction, an order of the
trial court granting a temporary injunction is not a final order; . . . An order
overruling a motion to vacate such temporary injunction is not a final order;
... Order sustaining motion to dissolve temporary injuction is not a final order;
... But, an order dissolving a temporary restraining order is a final order. Hersch
v. Home Savings & Loan Co., 59 Ohio App. 145, 17 N. E. (2d) 377 (1939).
An order sustaining a motion for a new trial is not a final order. Andrews
v. Ackerman Coal Co., 59 Ohio App. 65, 17 N. E. (2d) 274 (1939).
An order overruling a motion to quash summons and set aside service is not
a final order. Wolf v. Western & Southern Life Insurance Co., 59 Ohio App. 238,
17 N. E. (2d) 438 (1939).
An order overruling a motion to dismiss an appeal from a municipal court
to the Court of Common Pleas is not a final order. Federal Pipe & Supply Co.
v. Dolby, 59 Ohio App. 143, 17 N. E. (2d) 397 (1939).
An order granting a new trial because of alleged misconduct of a jury is not
a final order. Ramsey v. Oyler, 133 Ohio St. 321, 13 N. E. (2d) 577 (1938).
FINAL ORDERS:
An order, setting aside an order appointing a receiver and granting an injunc-
tion in a proceeding after judgment in aid of execution, is an order affecting a
substantial right and reviewable by the Court of Appeals as a judgment. G. C.-
12258 (1930), now G. C.-12223-2; Ohio Const., Art. IV, Sec. 6; Sam Savin, Inc.
v. Burdsall, (Ohio. App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 914.
NOrTFS
Immediately following judgment rendered by the lower court, there
is an allowance of three days for the filing of a motion for a new trial.
When this motion is overruled, the appealing counsel submits an entry
which, when signed by the presiding judge, becomes a final order from
which an appeal may be prosecuted. Then, under G. C. 12223-7,6 the
appealing counsel is allowed twenty days from the signing of the final
order entry, to file the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal is filed
with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is being taken, stating
merely the judgment from which the appeal is sought, and further
whether the subject of the appeal is on "questions of law" or on "ques-
tions of law and fact." It is interesting to note, at this point, that all
review is now considered a continuation of the case, and hence no serv-
ice of Notice of Appeal on the parties to the action is required; how-
ever, as a matter of comity, it is generally considered good practice to
send a copy of the Notice of Appeal to the opposing counsel.... And
A trial court's action in overruling a motion to intervene as defendant in a
foreclosure action is a "final order" from which an appeal will lie. Central Na-
tional Bank of Cleveland v. Newton Steel Co., (Ohio App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d)
428.
An order of the trial court vacating a judgment on one of enumerated statu-
tory grounds after term, although erroneous, is not a nullity, but a final order.
G. C.-11631; Frankenstein v. Behrendt, 135 Ohio St. 570-572, 21 N. E. (2d) 678
(1939).
An order dismissing a garnishee is a final order. Hamilton v. Temple; 60
Ohio App. 94, 19 N. E. (2d) 650 (1939).
A declaratory judgment is a final order. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dixie
Terminal Co., 59 Ohio App. 305, 17 N. E. (2d) 954 (1939).
Appointment of a receiver in an action to foreclose a mortgage on realty is a
final order. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Begin, 59 Ohio App. 5, 16 N. E.
(2d) 1015 (1938).
An order of the Common Pleas court allowing payment of attorney fees out of
a fund in its custody, prior to final determination of the issues of the case is a
final order. Barnes v. 53rd Union Trust Co., 58 Ohio App. 27, 15 N. E. (2d) 651
(1938).
An order sustaining plaintiff's motion for a new trial after setting aside judg-
ment for defendaht on its motion for directed verdict is a final order. Durbin v.
Humphrey Co., 133 Ohio St. 367, 14 N. E. (2d) 5 (1938).
See also, Annotations following Omo GENnRAi CODE § 12258.
6 "The period of time after the entry of the order, judgment, decree, or other
matter for review within which the appeal shall be perfected, unless otherwise
provided by law, is as follows:
1. In appeals to the supreme court, to courts of appeals, or from municipal
courts and from probate courts to courts of common pleas, within twenty
(20) days.
Provided that, when a motion for new trial is duly filed by either party
within three days after the verdict or decision then the time of perfecting
the appeal shall not begin to run until the entry of the order overruling the
motion for new trial.
2. In all other appeals, within ten (10) days.
3. In case of insanity or death of a party after judgment, the court shall have
the power to extend the time for filing the appeal, an additional twenty
(20) days."
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further, the party appealing is designated as the appellant, and the
adverse party appellee; and the style of the case remains the same as
in the court of its origin,7 . . .thus abolishing the difficulty of deter-
mining the status of the party-litigants.
With respect to declaration of the subject matter of the appeal, an-
other common law technicality has been abolished; the procedural
method of review in cases of law and equity are the same; equity cases
being known as an "appeal on questions of law and fact," and law
cases known as an "appeal on questions of law" . .. and in doubtful
cases, it is not necessary to "go up both ways," since amendment and
transfer are now permitted.8 The failure to designate the type of hear-
ing on appeal shall not be jurisdictional and the notice of appeal may
be amended by the appellate court in the furtherance of justice for
good cause shown.9
Under G. C. 12223-6, except as provided in G. C. 12223-12,10 no
appeal shall be effective as an appeal upon questions of law and fact
unless and until the order, judgment or decree appealed from is super-
seded by a bond in the amount and with the conditions as hereinafter
provided, and unless and until a supersedeas bond be executed on the
part of the appellant to the adverse party with sufficient surety in such
sum, not less than the amount of the judgment and interest, as is di-
rected by the court making the order which is sought to be superseded,
or by the court to which the appeal is taken, conditioned as hereinafter
provided in G. C. 12223-14.1 However, on an appeal on questions
7 "The notice of appeal shall designate the order, judgment, or decree ap-
pealed from and whether the appeal shall be on questions of law or questions of
law and fact. In said notice the party appealing shall be designated the appellant,
and the adverse party, the appellee, and the style of the case shall be the same
as in the court of origin.... "
8 DAwsoN, OHIO APPELLATE Rxviaw, p. 4 (1935).
9 Schreiner v. Cincinnati Altenheim, (Ohio App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 587;
In re Wernet's Estate, (Ohio App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 490; Caryl v. Scheiderer,
(Ohio App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 463; Paden v. Pearce, (Ohio App. 1939) 22 N. E.
(2d) 301; Dewar v. Hector, (Ohio App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 535. See also OHIO
GENERAL CoDE, § 12223-5.
10 "Executors, guardians, receivers, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, and
county treasurers, acting in their respective trust capacities, who have given bond
in this state, with surety according to law, and the state of Ohio or an officer
thereof shall not be required to give the bond mentioned in General Code sec-
tion 12223-9."
11 "The supersedeas bond shall be payable to the adverse party or other-
wise, as may be directed by the court, when the conflicting interests of the
parties require it, and subject to a condition to the effect that the party appeal-
ing shall abide and perform the order and judgment of the appellate court and
pay all money, costs, and damages which may be required of or awarded against
him upon the final determination of said appeal and such other conditions as the
court may provide, and, when such judgment is for the payment of money, the
bond shall provide that if said judgment is not paid upon final affirmance that
judgment may be entered against the sureties on said bond."
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of law, no bond is generally required. The apparent reason for this
discrepancy is that an appeal on questions of law and fact, requiring
a supersedeas bond, is essentially a retrial of the case.
Having filed the Notice of Appeal within the required twenty days
following the entry of the final order of the court from which the ap-
peal is being prosecuted; and also having filed the bond as required
if the appeal is on questions of law and fact, the next step is under
G. C. 12223-8. ". . .Within ten (10) days after filing notice of ap-
peal, or the order allowing the appeal or a certified copy thereof, where
permission to file the appeal is required, the clerk of the court from
which the appeal is taken or a judge thereof, shall, upon being paid
the lawful fees and the filing of a praecipe therefor, prepare and file in
the court to which the appeal is taken, a transcript of the docket or
journal entries, with such original papers or transcripts thereof as are
necessary to exhibit the error complained of. The transcript of the
testimony or bill of exceptions or so much thereof as may be necessary
for said appeal may be filed within such time as is provided for in. the
rules of court. In event the transcript and papers are not filed within
said time, either party may apply to the court to which the appeal is
taken to have the case docketed and the court shall order them filed."
... It is a general practice to hire a public stenographer who will make
a typewritten form of all the testimony, objections, motions, etc., thus
completing the entire record of the lower court proceedings, and set-
ting forth the claims upon which the appellant may intend to rely;
this being the Bill of Exceptions. It should be noted here that al-
though the "taking of exceptions" has been abolished, it is still the
practice to call the transcript of errors, etc., the "Bill of Exceptions."
When the appealing counsel submits or files his brief with the Bill
of Exceptions, the attention of the appellate court is called to the as-
signment of alleged errors, generally set out in numerical order to en-
able the presiding justices to more readily determine the appealibility
and merits of the litigation before them. It is also a recognized prac-
tice for the party-litigants to state in their briefs whether or not they
desire an oral argument before the Court of Appeals, or, when the
court convenes and the Docket number is called, the appealing attorneys
may state their intention of oral argument if desired. If oral hearing is
requested, the chairman of the Court of Appeals sets the case for a
particular date. -Many cases are submitted for determination on the
briefs alone. With regard to hearing on appeal, it is necessary to refer
to G. C. 12223-21, "Appeals taken on questions of law shall be
heard upon assignments of error filed in the cause or set out in the
briefs of the appellant before hearing. Errors not argued may be dis-
regarded, but the court, in its discretion, may consider and decide
errors which are not assigned or specified. Failure to file such briefs
and assignments of error within the time prescribed by the court rules
